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Preface
This paper examines air coercion, a strategy of increasing importance to the Air Force and other Services. Although a number of scholars have begun to reexamine coercion strategies in some detail, to include theory and its application in historical case studies, there are two key weaknesses in the existing literature. First, despite much recent attention, air coercion is still poorly defined, and the term itself is too often misused by scholars. Second, there has not been enough study of specific coercive mechanisms and how air campaigns have sought to influence them. This paper addresses these two shortcomings, giving those who advocate and employ airpower a better understanding of air coercion, its effective application, and its limitations.
I would like to thank Mr. Budd Jones, my Air Command and Staff College faculty research advisor, for the superb assistance and insights he provided. He helped me to conceptualize and put appropriate boundaries around an exceptionally complex yet important topic. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the small but growing group of air coercion theorists who have had the academic and moral courage to engage with such a difficult topic, and from whose studies I have profited in crafting this paper. Any disagreements I have with their views are meant not as criticism, but rather as a means of refining our collective thinking about air coercion.
right mix of targets for a particular conflict, and then impacting them effectively in order to trigger coercive mechanisms, is a key prerequisite for success. When contemplating coercive strategies, it is also crucial to have a deep understanding of adversary leadership.
To succeed, air coercion must influence adversary leadership to do the things we want them to do. Otherwise, coercion strategies will be ineffective. Consequently, to determine the best means by which to influence adversary leaders, air campaign planners This understanding of coercive mechanisms is central to the development and successful execution of air coercion strategies, as case studies in later chapters illustrate.
It is also clear that military leaders must integrate air coercion strategies effectively with other national instruments of power. An air coercion effort carried out in isolation from diplomatic, economic, and information elements of national power is very unlikely to succeed. The case studies presented below make this abundantly clear.
Finally, it is also worth noting that if a coercive effort does not conform to overarching policy objectives, it will fail, regardless of how brilliantly it is otherwise conceived.
vi Chapter 1
Defining Air Coercion
War should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy…The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander can make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.
-Carl von Clausewitz
Why Coercion Matters
Over the past 50 years, the Armed Forces of United States have waged a number of undeclared wars around the world. These conflicts, though unique in their character and circumstances, had one thing in common: For reasons of policy and strategy, our political leaders placed limits on both their ends and means. These limitations derived initially from the Cold War and the attendant fear of nuclear holocaust. However, limited wars and carefully proscribed military operations, with their great complexity and potential frustration, remain the norm even in the wake of the Cold War.
One of the key issues air strategists must consider in this new age of limited war is the proper role of airpower and, more specifically, scenarios in which air coercion strategies can help to achieve policy objectives. 
The Strategic Environment
In this new age of limited war, political leaders are often faced with complex crises where something less than the maximum use of force is the only viable option.
Several factors have combined to make limited wars the norm since 1945. During the Cold War, fear of nuclear conflict played a major role. Yet since the end of the Cold War, five other factors have become prominent. Perhaps the key factor driving a preference for limited wars is the strategic environment itself, in which the United States is the predominant power. The absence of a peer competitor makes total war unlikely in the near future. Consequently, the ends sought and means employed tend to be limited. This is particularly true in smaller conflicts where less-than-vital national interests are at stake. Also, with the artificial stability of the Cold War a thing of the past, older animosities, based on cultural factors such as ethnicity and religion, have emerged once again as serious threats to regional and global stability, often driving US involvement.
Cost is the second factor. The expense of waging modern war results in an imperative to limit the scope, duration, and intensity of armed conflicts. 
-Thomas Schelling
Coercive Mechanisms in the Strategic Context
As noted previously, coercive mechanisms are the means by which attacks on various targets translate into coercive leverage against adversary leadership. Despite the importance of choosing proper coercive mechanisms for air coercion strategies, little has been written about why and how coercive mechanisms work well in one case but not in another. Robert Pape made this clear when he said, "mechanisms by which military effects are supposed to translate into political results are hardly ever studied."
1 He says we must seek to understand why and how targeting a certain mechanism produces effects that compel an adversary to do our will. Colonel Robert Owen echoes this key point:
Missing is any discussion of how actions taken will produce the expected results. That is, if the strategy occurs, then the ends likely occur because of a certain mechanism. It specifies the theoretical foundation for the strategy. For example, the mechanism for Deliberate Force could have taken the following form: 'If force is applied to critical communications facilities of the Bosnian Serbs, then they will accede to UN demands because the loss of these communication facilities will result in a loss of control over their forces.
This question of choosing appropriate mechanisms, which receives much attention in succeeding chapters, is at the heart of developing effective air coercion strategies.
Pape made the latest comprehensive effort to clarify how and why air coercion might be an effective means of triggering coercive mechanisms to influence adversary decision-makers. He believes that matching a coercion strategy to a target state's specific vulnerabilities is the key to success. 3 Pape identifies four possible air coercion strategies-punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation-employed from the Second World War to the present. 4 Punishment involves bombing civilian populations in an effort to undermine their morale and convince adversary leaders to sue for peace. Risk strategies entail graduated and measured increases in coercive pressure to force compliance with the attacker's demands. Denial involves defeating an adversary's fielded forces, and hence his military strategy, making it impossible for him to achieve his objectives. Finally, decapitation seeks to kill enemy leaders or trigger a coup that replaces them with a more conciliatory regime. Pape argues that denial is the most effective strategy. 5 Yet denial does not always work in practice, nor does it provide a sound analytical basis for designing all air coercion strategies, as will become clear later.
Pape's typology of air coercion strategies, while an important point of departure, has shortcomings. His punishment strategy is not a realistic option in today's global environment, given the unwillingness of Western democracies to target civilians. Pape's risk strategy suffers from similar weaknesses. He says risk strategies, such as the Rolling
Thunder air campaign against North Vietnam, seek to influence opponents by inflicting increasing pain and damage, over time, until they concede. He ends by stating that risk is not an effective strategy. The problem here is twofold. First, he restricts the influence mechanisms affected by risk strategies to civilians. 6 As noted earlier, targeting civilians is not currently an option. More importantly, Pape makes risk a strategy in its own right, attributing it to Schelling and defining it as a threat or use of escalating punishment.
However, Schelling's concept of risk is more expansive and sophisticated: He views it as the motor that drives and thus defines all coercion strategies. Consequently, the term and its implications, as Pape employs them, are both inaccurate and unduly restrictive. 7 Pape believes the third strategy-denial-is most effective. 8 Viewed in this light, key targets that might influence leaders include the underpinnings of their power (the military and internal security organs), the means by which they exercise power (including the media), and their personal assets. Equally important is to know who their key supporters are, and to target items of value to them as well.
The next step is to determine how striking these targets will translate into coercive leverage; in other words, identifying specific coercive mechanisms. Mechanisms are as different as the leaders they are designed to influence. As the next chapters illustrate, the air pressure campaign in Korea was designed to increase pressure on communist leaders by attacking things they valued, including cities, irrigation dams, trucks and locomotives supplying front-line forces, and other high-value assets leaders were reluctant to lose.
Attacks on these targets were designed to make the costs of continuing the war too high Milosevic given the public's political activism in previous years. In all three casesKorea, Bosnia, and Serbia-it is also crucial to realize that air coercion succeeded only as part of a larger coercion strategy involving all available instruments of power. As will become clear below, air coercion in Korea and the Balkans succeeded because it focused on leadership influence by targeting those things leaders valued and feared to lose.
Having established that adversary leadership should be the primary focus of air coercion strategies, and that other targets are secondary and valuable only to the extent that striking them triggers coercive mechanisms that produce leverage on adversary leaders, one key question remains: How can we be sure that air coercion will work as anticipated against a particular adversary leader? There is obviously no guarantee that adversary leaders will react to coercion exactly as we hope they will. In fact, it is more likely that they will react in a way we do not anticipate. Since Robert Pape's study, other 
The Heirs of Robert Pape
In the first of these two studies, Mark Sullivan analyzes Pape's denial strategy in concert with Joseph Engelbrecht's theory of second-order change, which holds that leaders often will not negotiate until something of greater value to them than the current conflict (and its objectives) is put at risk. 16 Engelbrecht sees three key ingredients in second-order change. The first is a failure of the adversary's military strategy and a consequent shift from the offensive to the defensive. From there, military defeats prompt leaders to shift their focus from winning the war to protecting higher-order values such as their political independence, cultural integrity, or the very existence of their country. The final element is some sort of crisis or severe shock that puts these higher-order values at serious risk. 17 Sullivan's conclusion is that air coercion strategies must seek both denial and second-order change by defeating an adversary leadership's military strategy and at the same time putting at risk something they value enough to cause a second-order change. 18 In 28 Foot instead points to war weariness as a key factor. The North Korean economy was in tatters, and the attacks on irrigation dams, addressed below, threatened major food shortages. The
Chinese were also feeling economic pain. In 1951, military spending absorbed 48 percent of their total budget. By 1953, they were anxious to re-direct their energies to rebuilding China's economy, ravaged by World War II and their own civil war.
29
Devising the Air Pressure Strategy
To break the deadlock, UN military leaders agreed in May 1952 that an air pressure strategy could play a role in compelling Red leaders to reach an agreement. It centered on four elements: stepped-up interdiction; more attacks on strategic targets;
bringing MiG-15 pilots to combat on terms favorable to F-86 pilots; and attacks on irrigation dams. These actions, all part of a larger coercion strategy with a full-court diplomatic press, sought to make the costs of continued fighting prohibitive for Red leaders. 30 The purpose of stepped-up interdiction was to raise the level of economic pain.
Key here is the fact that UN air forces improved steadily from mid-1952 to early 1953.
Night attacks, using radar-equipped B-26 bombers also equipped with spotlights, improved as enhanced radar, better training, and more aircraft combined to increase effectiveness. 31 Vehicle kills of 2,500-3,000 per month, and locomotive kills in the dozens, increased the costs of the Red war effort. North Korean propaganda, which until March 1953 decried mass destruction from "terrorist" air attacks, changed its tune in March, claiming that UN air attacks were ineffective, a sure sign that they were painful.
32
Along with interdiction, attacks on strategic targets increased. Since July 1952, B-29 bombers had conducted several devastating raids on Pyongyang. 33 When the communists again balked at signing an armistice in April, UN aircraft destroyed the Suiho hydroelectric dam, which supplied much of the power for Chinese industry in Manchuria. 34 Of equal note, logistics and training improvements nearly doubled B-29 sorties in the war's last year and also improved bombing accuracy. 35 As interdiction and strategic attacks continued, UN airmen began Operation
Moolah, which offered a cash reward of $50,000 to MiG-15 pilots who defected with their aircraft. On 26 April 1953, B-29s dropped a million leaflets over the Yalu, while radio broadcasts also made the offer. 36 This effort sought to increase communist fears about the reliability of their pilots, force a withdrawal of unreliable pilots from MiG-15 squadrons, and prompt pilots to defect. This PSYOPS plan worked. Soviet MiG-15 pilots-the best on the Red side-rarely appeared after April. 37 Because the communists were determined to contest UN air superiority close to the Yalu, they continued to fly MiG-15s, but with less-capable Chinese and North Korean pilots. From 1 May to 27
July, F-86 pilots made 165 MiG-15 kills at a cost of three Sabres. 38 This rout was a stinging defeat for communist leaders, and it led to lower losses and increased effectiveness for UN strike aircraft. Eisenhower then stated publicly that he did not understand why Truman had prohibited "hot pursuit" by Sabres over the Yalu. When combined with many cases of "hot pursuit" in early 1953, this likely increased Red fears that he might support "hot pursuit" officially. 39 Hard on the heels of Moolah, air strikes began on irrigation dams.
In late 1952, air planners realized that strikes on selected dams could cause major damage. 40 Eisenhower's determination to end the fighting facilitated a strike against Toksan dam on 13 May 1953, followed by attacks on Chasan dam on 15/16 May. Both attacks succeeded. Once Toksan dam was breached, the resulting flood washed out six miles of railroad embankment and five bridges, two miles of highway, and 700 buildings.
It also destroyed five square miles of rice crops. 41 The attack on Chasan had similar effects. Although the North Koreans countered by lowering water levels in other dams to forestall another catastrophe, this was costly because it deprived rice fields of water.
42
Why the Air Pressure Strategy Succeeded
The air pressure campaign was a successful use of air coercion in conjunction with other instruments of power. Communist leaders had reached the point of diminishing returns and recognized that any benefit to be gained by demanding a favorable POW-exchange process would be outweighed by the cost. They must also have feared the implications of Eisenhower's threats to increase the war's intensity. decided to quit while they were ahead. 44 Attacks on the dams probably pushed North
Korean leaders, already in the domain of losses, to go along. Finally, and critical in analyzing the success of air coercion, both sides kept negotiating, reminding us that coercion strategies must give both sides room to find common ground.
Notes
Chapter 4
Air Coercion Comes of Age: Operation Deliberate Force
Every bomb was a political bomb.
-General Michael Ryan
Background
The Unlike Korea, where ends were limited but means nearly total, Deliberate Force was waged for limited ends with limited means. NATO leaders recognized the importance of halting Bosnian Serb excesses, but they-and particularly the Americans-viewed it as a campaign to uphold something less than vital national interests. However, they did recognize that Bosnian Serb tenacity and obstinance, as well as the high stakes involved (from both the NATO and Bosnian Serb perspective) would require a tough air campaign.
Developing the Air Campaign
From the outset, planners focused on influencing adversary leaders, including 
Why DELIBERATE FORCE Succeeded
The Bosnian Serb leadership, pummeled simultaneously on the ground by the Croats and Bosnian Federation, and from the air by NATO, did not want to lose any more ground, so they conceded. As in Korea, NATO and Contact Group leaders used a carrot as well as a stick. They agreed to several Bosnian Serb demands, including recognition of the Republica Srpska as an autonomous state within Bosnia that has "special ties" with the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 6 The Serbs had sought this throughout the negotiations, and it helped them decide to quit while they were ahead. Where Does Air Coercion Go from Here?
In essence, air power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.
-Colonel Phillip Meilinger
Air coercion is a strategy whose time has come. The absence of a peer competitor in the near term, and the burdens of being the world's greatest power, with unique military capabilities, will drive America's involvement in wars where less-than-vital national interests are at stake. In most of these conflicts, the imperative will be to achieve policy objectives with little expenditure of blood or treasure. Airpower, with its potential to deliver decisive results fast and at relatively low cost, is a means of doing so. This became clear in Korea, was very evident during Deliberate Force, and has continued with Allied Force. Despite a shaky start, this most recent of air coercion efforts acts as a prism through which to view many of the key points raised in previous chapters.
Most striking about Allied Force was its abject failure to achieve NATO's initial military objectives. Clearly, NATO air planners failed to ask basic questions: what do adversary leaders value and fear, and which targets, once struck, would most influence them to accede to NATO's demands? Despite the centrality of Serb leaders, planners treated them as a secondary target set, instead focusing on Serb fielded forces. Planners thus chose the wrong primary focus. They also overlooked the difficulty of attacking Serb forces from the air and underestimated Serb leaders' resolve. Recognizing that policy issues imposed limits, the strategy nonetheless went badly awry. NATO eventually compelled Milosevic to settle, but only after shifting to different target sets.
A recent study of the reasons Milosevic acceded to NATO's demands arrives at some key conclusions. 1 The first is that bombing produced a political climate conducive to concession. By bringing unbearable pressure to bear on Serb leaders, the air campaign These key findings from Allied Force speak directly to issues, raised in this paper, that are at the heart of air coercion theory and must also inform its practice. Planners must make adversary leaders the primary focus of air coercion and choose specific targets only after careful deliberation about what leaders value and fear. To do so, they must understand why and how attacking these targets will influence adversary leaders; in other words, the precise means by which attacking a target will trigger a coercive mechanism that gives us leverage against adversary leaders. Perhaps even more important, they must also have the wisdom and moral courage to recognize when air coercion is not likely to be an effective strategy. There are situations in which we may not be able to influence adversary leaders effectively from the air. Recognizing those occasions, and making them clear to senior leaders, is every bit as important as advocating air coercion strategies that are likely to succeed. If air planners can do this, and if they remember the truism that airpower is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations, both before and during execution, air coercion will continue to develop as a key strategy option for the United States. 
